uncensored-send/internal/server/delete.go

package server

import (
	"net/http"
	"strings"

	"send/internal/auth"
	"send/internal/store"
)

// handleDelete removes an object early. Three credentials are accepted: the
// delete token handed to the uploader, the token that owns the object, and any
// admin token.
//
// There is only one delete route, and it is a POST, so the success page's plain
// form works with scripting disabled and no second code path is needed.
func (s *Server) handleDelete(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
	id, err := store.CleanID(r.PathValue("id"))
	if err != nil {
		s.fail(w, r, http.StatusNotFound, "No such file.")
		return
	}
	m, err := s.store.Get(id, s.now())
	if err != nil {
		s.fail(w, r, http.StatusNotFound, "No such file.")
		return
	}

	presented := s.deleteCredentials(w, r)
	if len(presented) == 0 {
		s.fail(w, r, http.StatusUnauthorized, "A delete token or an owning token is required.")
		return
	}
	if !s.authorised(m, presented) {
		s.fail(w, r, http.StatusForbidden, "That token cannot delete this file.")
		return
	}

	if err := s.store.Delete(id); err != nil {
		s.log.Error("deleting object", "id", id, "err", err)
		s.fail(w, r, http.StatusInternalServerError, "Could not delete the file.")
		return
	}
	s.log.Info("deleted", "id", id, "ip", clientIP(r, s.cfg))

	if wantsJSON(r) {
		writeJSON(w, http.StatusOK, map[string]string{"status": "deleted", "id": id})
		return
	}
	// Deleting from the administration table goes back to it. The destination
	// is built from configuration, never from the request, so this cannot be
	// turned into an open redirect.
	if r.PostFormValue("from") == "admin" {
		http.Redirect(w, r, s.cfg.BasePath+"admin", http.StatusSeeOther)
		return
	}
	s.render(w, http.StatusOK, "error.html", errorPage{
		page:    s.page(r, "Deleted", false),
		Status:  "Deleted",
		Message: "The file is gone.",
	})
}

// deleteCredentials collects every secret the request carries.
//
// Three can legitimately arrive at once — the object's delete token in the
// form, a token in the header, and a remembered token in the cookie — and any
// one of them may be the sufficient one. They are all collected so that the
// first one present cannot shadow the others.
func (s *Server) deleteCredentials(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) []string {
	var out []string
	add := func(secret string) {
		if secret = strings.TrimSpace(secret); secret != "" {
			out = append(out, secret)
		}
	}

	add(bearer(r))
	add(cookieCredential(r))

	// A small form post; the cap keeps this from being a way to stream a body
	// into memory. A non-form body simply fails to parse and is ignored.
	r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, maxFieldBytes)
	if err := r.ParseForm(); err == nil {
		add(r.PostFormValue("token"))
	}
	return out
}

// authorised reports whether any of the presented secrets may delete m.
func (s *Server) authorised(m *store.Meta, presented []string) bool {
	for _, secret := range presented {
		if s.mayDelete(m, secret) {
			return true
		}
	}
	return false
}

// mayDelete checks one secret against the object's delete token first, then
// against the token file.
func (s *Server) mayDelete(m *store.Meta, secret string) bool {
	if auth.EqualHash(m.DeleteHash, auth.HashSecret(secret)) {
		return true
	}
	if err := s.tokens.MaybeReload(); err != nil {
		s.log.Error("reloading token file", "err", err)
	}
	t := s.tokens.Lookup(secret)
	if t == nil {
		return false
	}
	return t.Admin || (m.Owner != "" && t.Name == m.Owner)
}